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Abstract: A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic had been responsible for introducing the Vienna Circle’s 
ideas, developed within a Germanophone framework, to an Anglophone readership. Inevitably, this migration 
from one context to another resulted in the alteration of some of the concepts being transmitted. Such alterations 
have served to facilitate a number of false impressions of Logical Empiricism from which recent scholarship 
still tries to recover. In this paper, I will attempt to point to the ways in which LTL has helped to foster the 
various mistaken stereotypes about Logical Empiricism which were combined into the received view. I will 
begin by examining Ayer’s all too brief presentation of an Anglocentric lineage for his ideas. This lineage, as 
we shall see, simply omits the major 19
th
 century Germanophone influences on the rise of analytic philosophy. 
The Germanophone ideas he presents are selectively introduced into an Anglophone context, and directed 
towards various concerns that arose within that context. I will focus on the differences between Carnap’s version 
of the overcoming of metaphysics, and Ayer’s reconfiguration into what he calls the elimination of metaphysics. 
Having discussed the above, I will very briefly outline the consequences that Ayer’s radicalisation of the Vienna 




In the somewhat apologetic introduction to the second edition of Language, Truth, and Logic 
(LTL), published a decade after the first edition in 1946, A. J. Ayer (1946, p. 5) calls the book 
“a young man’s book [...] written with more passion than most philosophers allow themselves 
to show, at any rate in their published work”. According to Ayer, this might help account for 
its having reached “a larger audience than it might have had otherwise” (ibid.). Though 
Ayer’s initial expression of regret regards merely the tone of the book, the introduction of the 
second edition goes on to develop his well-known series of extensive revisions to the core 
Logical Empiricist doctrines presented in the first edition. This includes, among other things, 
a discussion of the verification principle that leads him to a substantially weakened version 
by comparison to the bold claims of the first edition.
2
 
 Yet some of what Ayer had tried to excuse as an effect of youthful passion, and what 
we may with hindsight now see as being simply erroneous, still survives after Ayer’s various 
revisions to the book. LTL undeniably played a crucial role in bringing some of the Vienna 
Circle’s interwar debates to the forefront of Anglophone philosophy (especially during the 
                                                          
1
 This paper was first presented in 2018 at the conference on ‘The Historical and Philosophical Significance of 
Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic’ at the University of Pécs, organised by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
and the “Empiricism and atomism in twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon philosophy” Research Group. I owe many 
thanks to all those present, as well as to the anonymous reviewers, for many helpful questions and suggestions. I 
am particularly grateful to Adam Tamas Tuboly for inviting me to contribute to the conference and book, and 
for his many insightful comments and suggestions. 
2
 For a detailed discussion of weaker versions of verificationism see Hans-Johann Glock’s chapter in this 
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decade that followed the Second World War).
3
 As Ayer (1946, p. 5) himself says about the 
book, “for reasons not wholly dependent upon its merits, it has achieved something of the 
status of a text book”. Like any textbook, its sketches of some of the views it presents and 
advocates helped to forge something which we may call the received view of Logical 
Empiricism in the Anglophone world. It has thus contributed to setting up one of the most 
important tasks faced by historians of analytic philosophy in the last three decades or so: the 
task of challenging this received view. 
 In this chapter, I will outline the ways in which LTL has helped to foster various 
mistaken stereotypes about Logical Empiricism that would later be combined in forming the 
received view. I will begin by examining Ayer’s all too brief presentation of an Anglocentric 
lineage for his ideas. This lineage, as we shall see, simply omits the major 19
th
 century 
Germanophone influences on the rise of analytic philosophy. The Germanophone ideas he 
presents are selectively introduced into an Anglophone context, and directed towards various 
concerns that arose within that context. I will focus on the differences between Carnap’s 
version of the overcoming of metaphysics, and Ayer’s reconfiguration into what he calls the 
elimination of metaphysics. Having discussed the above, I will very briefly outline the effect 
that Ayer’s radicalisation of the Vienna Circle’s doctrines had on the subsequent Anglophone 
reception of Logical Empiricism. 
 
2. An Anglocentric Provenance 
One of the basic difficulties that LTL presents to the historian of philosophy derives from the 
fact that it presents its views and arguments almost as if they were completely detached from 
the Germanophone context in which they were initially developed. This is not, necessarily, 
something for which Ayer should be admonished.
4
 Rather, as we shall see, it may be more 
charitable to see this expectation as merely a by-product of the book’s (perhaps partly 
unintentional) use as a textbook introduction to Logical Empiricism. Despite having 
subsequently served this goal, nowhere in the book does Ayer state that his purpose is to 
introduce the Vienna Circle’s work to an Anglophone audience. Ayer simply sets out to 
present a series of abstract views and arguments, whose provenance is mostly left 
unexamined. Like many subsequent systematic works of analytic philosophy, the history and 
context of the views put forth by LTL remains mostly irrelevant to its goal of arguing for or 
against certain philosophical positions. In some cases, the positions advocated by Ayer are 
simply restatements of positions defended by all or some of the Vienna Circle’s members. 
What complicates matters further is that some of the positions advocated by Ayer turn out to 
be his own responses to the work of the Vienna Circle, rather than restatements thereof. In 
other words, LTL suffers from the absence of a clear-cut demarcation between Ayer’s own 
views and his restatement of the Vienna Circle’s. It is from this absence, as we shall see, that 
various confusions arise. 
 Ayer does not completely refrain from at least partly commenting on the provenance 
of his views when he vaguely acknowledges that 
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 Susan Stebbing was also largely responsible for introducing the Vienna Circle’s ideas to British philosophers 
in her 1933 British Academy address; see Stebbing (1933a); see also Siobhan Chapman’s discussion of 
Stebbing in her chapter of this volume. 
4
 In an interview from 1989, Ayer says that he “didn’t speak much German” at the time, and that “I couldn’t 
really take much part in their debates, but I understood what was going on” (Ayer and Honderich 1991, p. 209). 
This may at least partly account for his ignorance of the Germanophone context in which the Vienna Circle’s 
ideas were developed (see e.g. Carnap, Neurath and Hahn 1929/1991). Nonetheless, in that same interview, 
more than fifty years after LTL was published, Ayer still discusses the obscurity of nonsensical German (and 
French) philosophy, as opposed to the clarity of English-speaking philosophy in the tradition of British 
Empiricism (Ayer and Honderich 1991, pp. 212-213 and 225). 
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the philosophers with whom I am in the closest agreement are those who compose the “Viennese 
circle”, under the leadership of Moritz Schlick, and are commonly known as logical positivists. 




In fact, Carnap’s name is mentioned on nine of the 160 pages of the book (32, 44, 58, 59, 91, 
130, 140, 151 [155]), while Schlick’s work is mentioned on four (32, 36, 37, 90 [159]). When 
it comes to other members of the Vienna Circle, the book includes two footnote mentions of 
Neurath (91, 151 [158]), two of Hahn (86, 136 [156]), and one of Waismann (37 [160]). As 
far as the Berlin circle is concerned, only Hempel gets a single footnote mention (91 [156]). 
 So far, this is in keeping with the book’s abstract, problem-focused systematic 
approach. Yet the relatively marginal mentions of the influence the “Viennese circle” had on 
LTL can be contrasted with the first statement of the preface, which draws a particular picture 
of the provenance of analytic philosophy: 
 
The views which are put forward in this treatise derive from the doctrines of Bertrand Russell 
and Wittgenstein, which are themselves the logical outcome of the Empiricism of Berkeley and 
David Hume. (Ayer 1946, p. 31) 
 
Obviously this claim is problematic on multiple counts. It seems that, for Gilbert Ryle’s 
envoy to Vienna,
6
 quickly establishing an Anglocentric provenance for his ideas takes 
priority over getting the facts straight about the Germanophone philosophers with whom he 
“is in the closest agreement” (1946, p. 32). This is corroborated by various similar attempts in 
LTL to establish a British lineage for analytic philosophy, arguing that Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume are not metaphysicians but analysts (1946, pp. 52-55), setting up a tradition which 
Ayer sees as being passed on to them from Hobbes (1946, p. 55), and leading up through 
Bentham and Mill (1946, p. 55), to Moore and Russell, to the empiricist brand of philosophy 
advocated by Ayer himself.
7
 Ayer (1946 p. 55-56) even goes on to conclude that: “we may 
fairly claim that in holding that the activity of philosophising is essentially analytic we are 
adopting a standpoint which has always been implicit in English [sic] empiricism”. 
 In what follows, I will come to question whether there is, indeed, anything ‘fair’ in 
this Anglicized depiction of a Germanophone philosophical tradition. I will begin by 
questioning the false assumptions and omissions behind the British lineage presented by 
Ayer, pointing towards a more accurate rendition of the history of proto-analytic philosophy. 
 Though this enterprise is, of course, made easier by the hindsight offered by recent 
work in the historiography of analytic philosophy, it is, as we shall see, a rendition that was 
not entirely unavailable to Ayer at the time. Thus I will take care to avoid anachronism by 
comparing Ayer’s presentation of Logical Empiricism with other contemporary Anglophone 
writings on the topic. Given that Ayer’s book is among the first to discuss the topic in 
English, there are only a relatively small number of other sources to compare him with 
(compared to the booming Anglophone discussions of the Vienna Circle in the decades that 
follow).
8
 A further candidate is Ernest Nagel’s “Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic 
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 This may be compared with the acknowledgement section of his “Demonstration of the impossibility of 
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developed by Schlick, Carnap, and Wittgenstein (1934a, 335). 
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Cambridge to attend Wittgenstein’s lectures); see Ayer and Honderich 1991, p. 209. 
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8
 By 1936, a number of Vienna and Berlin Circle members had already started publishing articles in English, 
e.g. Kurt Grelling (1928) Otto Neurath (1931/1983); Moritz Schlick, (1931/1979, 1932/1979, 1935/1979); 
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Philosophy in Europe”, along with LTL a seminal source for the Anglophone dissemination 
of Logical Empiricism.
9
 Both LTL and Nagel’s paper were published in January 1936, and so 
Ayer could not be expected to have read Nagel’s article. Thus the comparison between Nagel 
and Ayer serves a very specific qualified purpose: to show that it would not be, strictly 
speaking, anachronistic to expect, in January 1936, of a philosopher who knew about the 
Vienna Circle’s work to write, in English, about certain things that Ayer does not mention.10 
 
3. Omissions Made by Ayer’s History of Logical Empiricism 
There are a number of problems with the picture of the history of analytic philosophy Ayer 
conjures. These have to do primarily with what is left out of the picture, as I shall proceed to 
show. As we will see, there may be in each case various extenuating circumstances for 
Ayer’s omissions. 
 
3.1. Empiricism vs. Rationalism 
I will begin at the start of Ayer’s timeline. Ayer’s history begins with a stereotypical 
exposition of the opposition between British Empiricism and Continental Rationalism.
11
 This 
is presented as an “outstanding philosophical dispute” (1946, p. 133) in metaphysics over 
whether “there exists a supra-sensible world which is the object of a purely intellectual 
intuition and is alone wholly real” (1946, p. 134). Ayer not only appeals to this ‘dispute’ in 
order to establish the British lineage of his own position, but also to show the ways in which 
his brand of empiricism resolves the dispute by correcting the mistakes of his Empiricist 
predecessors.
12
 The linguistic empiricism of LTL is thus presented as: 
 
1) partly conceding the Rationalist critique of classical Empiricism, while rejecting the 
metaphysical conclusions the critique had driven them to; 
2) in this way, fortifying empiricism by rejecting the mistaken assumptions of its classical 
proponents; and 
3) thus both aligning itself with the Empiricist side of the dispute, and also resolving the 
dispute in an empiricist manner. 
 
 The abstract conception of the opposition between Empiricism and Rationalism 
presented by Ayer may not have been surprising to an average early twentieth-century 
philosophical audience. Indeed, at the time and until relatively recently, this would have been 
a standard version of the history of philosophy. The conception of Empiricism and 
Rationalism as two completely distinct and disputing ‘isms’ has been shown by more recent 
scholarship not to match the actual views of the authors who are supposedly the chief 
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 An overview of the contemporary Anglophone presentations of Logical Empiricism, including, apart from 
Ayer, Stebbing, and Nagel, the work of Charles Morris, is given in Pincock (forthcoming). (Of these, I will not 
consider Morris’ book since it was published after Ayer’s.) An even earlier stage in the Anglophone reception of 
Logical Empiricism is described in Verhaegh (forthcoming). 
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 Weinberg (1936) also covers a lot of the material that Ayer omitted, but was only published, after LTL. 
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 Of course there are continuities between early modern and Logical Empiricism; see e.g. Krisztián Pete’s 
chapter on the connections between Ayer and Berkley’s non-cognitivism. 
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 In 1931 Reichenbach offers a similar presentation of his stance as a ‘triumph’ of both rationalism and 
empiricism; see Reichenbach (1931/1978). 
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representatives of either camp (see e.g. Loeb (1981) and Norton (1981)). This type of 
questioning has led towards revisions of the traditional misunderstanding of the opposition 
between a British and a Continental triumvirate, which is seen by those who dispute it as 
disfiguring the history of early modern philosophy in order to fit a specific canon. (The 
canon, consisting of the work of white European males, has tended to bypass the significant 
contributions of non-white, non-European, non-male philosophers). It is perhaps no wonder 
that the three British figures that Ayer chose as his modern predecessors were also the three 
figures that were taught in the University programs which would end up using Ayer’s book as 
a textbook. Whether this was intentional or not, Ayer’s conception of a British early modern 
lineage for analytic philosophy could also be put to use in marketing LTL as a textbook. In 
summary, Ayer’s initial claim to the Britishness of his brand of empiricism relies on a series 
of assumptions about the history of early modern philosophy which, though canonical at the 
time Ayer was writing, are currently being questioned by scholarship. 
 Interestingly, even if we were to suspend any judgment about whether the Rationalist-
Empiricist dispute was ever undertaken by any philosophers, Ayer’s characterization of it as a 
generalized metaphysical dispute is still questionable. The standard reading (i.e. that which 
has been undergoing the abovementioned questioning) sees the early modern clash between 
Empiricism and Rationalism as a disagreement primarily over epistemology, which is then 
extended into metaphysics (Longworth 2009, 67). Ayer’s depiction of the disagreement as 
one between positions within metaphysics seems to serve a particular purpose: it allows Ayer 
to claim that Logical Empiricism, in its ‘elimination’ of metaphysics, can bring the 
unnecessary dispute to an end (via 1-3 above). But, at least at first glance, this would seem to 
have misunderstood what the disagreement is about. 
 Is there a way to show that Ayer’s conception of the disagreement is not simply a 
misunderstanding? Perhaps Ayer’s unusual characterization of the dispute as ‘metaphysical’ 
is not meant to dispute the claim that it is an epistemological dispute. Rather, Ayer may be 
understood to claim that the dispute is ‘metaphysical’ in the specific sense deployed by LTL. 
In this sense, the dispute between Empiricism and Rationalism, in its early modern 
formulation, is metaphysical simply because it is not resolvable by appeal to either analytic or 
empirically testable propositions.  Though Ayer does not explicitly address it in this manner, 
his attempted resolution of the dispute does treat it so. Ayer should be understood to be 
saying that, once the metaphysical elements are eliminated, the dispute between Empiricism 
and Rationalism can be successfully resolved by the verificationist theory of meaning. In 
other words, read this way, Ayer’s understanding seems to be that the dispute was reached 
through the employment of metaphysical pseudo-statements on both sides; the elimination of 
such pseudo-statements clarifies that there had been no meaningful dispute to begin with. 
What remains can be reformulated in terms of LTL’s resolution of the pseudo-dispute. 
 Given the contemporary prevalence of the canonical conception of early modern 
philosophy in terms of an opposition between a Rationalist and an Empiricist triumvirate, 
Ayer’s attempt to resolve the dispute is unsurprising. Neither, of course, would the 
acceptance of this problematic version of the history of philosophy be singularly attributable 
to Ayer. The more obvious gaps in Ayer’s version of the history of analytic philosophy 
concern the long nineteenth century. This omission in Ayer’s book (among other such early 
historical sketches) may be held at least partly responsible for analogous gaps in many 
subsequent historiographic attempts up until the last quarter of the twentieth century. 
 
3.2. The Long 19th Century 
Ayer’s lineage, as outlined above, sees the British Empiricists’ work being continued by 
Bentham and Mill (whose work Ayer (1946, p. 559 implausibly reduces to ‘a development of 
the analyses carried out by Hume’). These names are only mentioned by Ayer in passing. The 
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only non-British name that Ayer mentions as a positive nineteenth century influence on 
analytic philosophy is that of Ernst Mach, though both mentions of his name in LTL (pp. 122 
and 137) are in conjunction with Hume’s name (in reference to their development of an 
“atomistic psychology” (pp. 122 and 137)). As we have seen, the proto-analytic work of the 
early modern British Empiricists is seen by Ayer as culminating in the work of Moore, 
Russell, and Wittgenstein, and through them in his own work. 
 A canonical nineteenth century name that one may immediately recognize as absent 
from this history of analytic philosophy is that of Gottlob Frege.
13
 This may seem surprising 
given the significance of modern logic for the tasks Ayer wishes to undertake in his book (see 
e.g. 1946, pp. 80-87). Nonetheless, Frege’s name is not once mentioned in Ayer’s book! 
Clearly the modern logic Frege had developed was far from being a strong contender against 
the prevalence of Aristotelian logic in the teaching curricula of philosophy departments at the 
time Ayer was writing.
14
 Nonetheless, modern logic played a central role in the development 
of the ideas under discussion in LTL, and Ayer does not shy away from discussing this role. 
Interestingly, when Ayer talks of non-Aristotelian logic, his references are to Russell and 
Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica rather than Frege’s Begriffschrift (e.g. p. 81, and even in 
the 1946 preface (p. 17)). 
 One may attempt to excuse Ayer for this by pointing to Frege’s relative obscurity at 
the time. With few exceptions, such as Russell’s (1903, pp. 501-522) discussions of his work, 
Frege’s name had mostly been absent from Anglophone philosophical debate during the 
time.
15
 A more notable exception is Gamertsfelder (1933, p. 108), who claims that Logical 
Positivism laid “its foundations on the positivistic empiricism of the 19th century, but more 
directly on the mathematico-physical work of Poincare, Einstein, Frege and Russell”. 
Furthermore, Ernest Nagel’s “Impressions and Appraisals of Analytic Philosophy in Europe”, 
also published in 1936 with the aim of introducing an Anglophone audience to analytic 
philosophy (including the Vienna Circle), mentions Frege throughout the work. Despite 
siding with Russell and his theory of definite descriptions (Nagel 1936a, p. 18), Nagel 
otherwise presents Russell and Frege’s views as closely related versions of logicism (e.g. 
Nagel 1936b, pp. 43-46). In comparison, though LTL contains a prolonged discussion of 
Russell’s theory of descriptions (1946, pp. 22-25, 60-62), it fails to mention Frege’s views in 
that discussion. Ayer even mentions the criticisms against Russell’s theory put forth by 
Stebbing and Moore (1946, pp. 22-23), though the possibility that Frege’s theory might pose 
a viable alternative to Russell’s is not considered. 
 
3.3. The Neurath-Haller Thesis 
Ayer’s partial historical account of the transmission of empiricism from modern British 
philosophers through contemporary Austrian philosophers (and back to Britain through his 
own work) seems to have left unanswered the question of how such British ideas found their 
way to Austria. How did these Germanophone authors, including Mach whom Ayer simply 
bundles together with Hume, come to be influenced by British Empiricism? If these are 
continental philosophers, should they not be working in some paradigmatically ‘continental’ 
post-Kantian tradition? 
 What Ayer’s account has left out has been the subject of the debate surrounding what 
is called the Neurath-Haller thesis (Haller 1986/1991). Its first instance is sketched in the 
1929 manifesto of the Vienna Circle (which Ayer could have accessed in 1936; see Carnap, 
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Neurath and Hahn 1929/1973). To be fair to Ayer, the manifesto only very briefly sets up the 
aforementioned Austrian lineage for the ‘scientific conception of the world’ put forth by its 
authors. By contrast to Ayer’s Anglocentric view, the manifesto acknowledges a wide array 
of international influences on the Vienna Circle, among which are found the British 
influences noticed by Ayer. The Viennese part of the lineage includes figures such as Mach, 
whom Ayer does briefly mention (1946, pp. 122, 137), and Boltzmann, but also Bolzano, 
Brentano, and his students (including e.g. Meinong). 
 Rudolf Haller (e.g. 1986/1991) interpreted the mentions of these Viennese figures in 
the manifesto as pointing to the existence and development of a somehow particularly 
Austrian type of philosophy, culminating in the work of the Vienna Circle. Though there are 
various problems with the idea that the internationalist philosophy of the Vienna Circle is 
somehow an Austrian national product (see e.g Smith (1997) and Damböck (forthcoming)), 
the fact that various Germanophone influences are at work in the development of Logical 
Empiricism is simply indisputable. Haller contrasts the influence of Kant on German 
philosophy with the shunning of this tradition by figures at work in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire such as Bolzano and later Brentano. The Brentanian development of a scientifically-
minded philosophy within an empiricist tradition is seen by both Neurath and later Haller as 
one of the many predecessors and allies of the scientific conception of the world (see Rock 
(2017) and Vrahimis (2018)). 
 Given the vagueness of the manifesto’s mentions of figures like Bolzano or Brentano, 
it might be unfairly anachronistic to expect an exploration of the Neurath-Haller thesis from 
Ayer. Even Nagel, who does explicitly address the philosophical legacies of both Bolzano 
(1936a, pp. 14, 18) and Brentano (1936b, p. 50), does not acknowledge any influence they 
may have had on Logical Empiricism.
16
 It should further be emphasized that the existence of 
an Austrian empiricist influence on the Vienna Circle would not undermine Ayer’s tracing of 
Logical Empiricism back to its early modern British outset. It would, however, add more 
detail to this lineage, allowing for a framing of the Vienna Circle’s work in terms of its 
alignment with a scientific, liberal, enlightenment oriented attitude. The required historical 
detail for understanding this context is not what Ayer was after, given that he was not 
primarily concerned with the history of ideas. 
 
3.4. Other Sources Ayer Does Not Mention 
There are, of course, numerous other international sources for the Vienna Circle which are, 
understandably, left unmentioned by Ayer. For example, Austria was clearly not the only 
place on the nineteenth century European continent where the development of a non-Kantian 
empiricist tradition can be discerned. Some other obvious examples to be mentioned here are 
French, such as that of Auguste Comte, from whose initial conception of ‘positivism’ both 
Ayer and the so-called ‘Logical Positivists’ of the Vienna Circle sought to dissociate 
themselves. 
 An interesting exception to the rule outlined above is a partial admission of influence 
by the French conventionalists, and specifically Poincare, who receives multiple references in 
LTL (82, 85, 95, 98).
17
 Ayer himself is attempting to develop a type of conventionalism about 
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 He does note that Tarski, who is vaguely in the line of influence of Brentano, “developed a deductive theory 
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17
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108). 
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analytic propositions in LTL (and elsewhere).
18
 In a later piece he would repeat the point that 
there was an important influence by Poincare on LTL, but that he “may not have stressed it so 
much as it deserves” (Ayer 1987, pp. 23-24, 28). 
 The search for a non-Kantian source of the ideas of the Vienna Circle has, during at 
least the past two decades, been put to the question by scholars. This is so especially in the 
case of Rudolf Carnap, who has been seen as at least partly responding to the Neo-Kantian 
philosophical tradition in which he was schooled (see e.g. Richardson (1990) and Friedman 
(2000)). Interpreting Carnap in light of Neo-Kantianism involves at least to some extent 
countenancing precisely the kind of Anglocentric perspective proposed by Ayer, according to 
which the Vienna Circle continues Russell’s development of empiricism. It was not, 
however, Ayer but rather Quine who had developed the specific thesis which has been 
addressed in the relevant debate, namely that Carnap’s Aufbau was a continuation of 
Russell’s earlier program of (Richardson 1990). 
 Thus, though Ayer’s presentation of Logical Empiricism’s Anglocentric lineage may 
have partly allowed for the seeming obviousness of Quine’s thesis, Ayer is not the person 
responsible for the particular conception of Carnap’s work. In fact, by contrast to other 
Germanophone thinkers omitted from Ayer’s account, Kant’s views receive considerable 
treatment in LTL. Ayer does present Kant as at least partly a predecessor for the anti-
metaphysical stance defended in his book.
19
 Like Carnap (1959, p. 60) before him, Ayer 
contrasts the new anti-metaphysical approach of Logical Empiricism with earlier failed 
efforts to eliminate metaphysics. According to Ayer (1946, pp. 34-35), the Kantian critique of 
transcendent metaphysics faces serious objections, as opposed to the new empiricist 
“elimination of metaphysics” which LTL advocates. The Kantian critique concedes too much 
to Rationalism when it “admit[s] that there are some truths about the world which we can 
know independently of existence” (1946, p. 73). Kant, along with Plato and Aristotle, are 
claimed by Ayer (1946, p. 56) to have primarily been concerned with working on 
philosophical analysis. Kant’s partly analytic and anti-metaphysical concerns, however, do 
not prevent him from developing mistaken views (all based on the misapplication of 
psychological observations) such as his transcendental aesthetic (p. 84), his notion of the 
categorical imperative (pp. 112-113), or even his attempt “to establish the existence of a 
transcendent god” (p. 114) by appeal to “the phenomena of moral experience” (ibid). 
 
4. The Diversity within Logical Empiricism 
One of the significant features of ‘Logical Empiricism’, to which we are led by our above 
discussion, is that of the diversity of views bundled together under its aegis. The Anglocentric 
lineage painted by Ayer, as well as his overall presentation, seems to imply the existence of a 
type of uniformity, and even a systematic program at work, within Logical Empiricism. Ayer 
does at least partly and indirectly acknowledge that not all his sources share the same views. 
Of course the obvious example is the book’s systematic attempt to improve on previous 
versions of verificationism, developing its own particular stance on the topic over the course 
of its two editions in 1936 and 1946. 
 Another example is that of LTL’s brief discussion of the method of validation for 
synthetic a posteriori propositions (pp. 90-91). Here Ayer presents an outline of Schlick’s 
views, and shows them to be in opposition to the views developed by Carnap, Neurath, and 
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the first edition of LTL he argues that analytic propositions “simply record our determination to use words in a 
certain fashion” (LTL, p. 84), but he differentiates this in the second edition of LTL (p. 17). 
19
 Though Kant is not directly referenced, his treatment of metaphysics may be what Carnap has in mind when 
he talks of metaphysics as “uncertain, on the ground that its problems transcend the limits of human knowledge” 
(Carnap 1932/1959, p. 60). 
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Hempel. In doing so, LTL summarily acknowledges the existence of the protocol-sentence 
debate. As will be explained in more detail by later chapters of this book, Ayer develops a 
particularly interesting hybrid view within the Circle’s debates, selectively adopting elements 
from various sides.
20
 Once again, however, it must be remembered that LTL is a systematic 
work. As a result, Ayer’s hybrid view is presented as resolving the protocol-sentence debate, 
and thereby as being the best option for Logical Empiricism. 
 Here we are, once again, faced with a confusion which derives from the kind of 
double function which LTL has served. The book is not a scholarly work on the views of the 
Vienna Circle, but rather presents Ayer’s own views. Nonetheless it is presenting Ayer’s 
views to an Anglophone audience with limited access, at this time, to the views the Vienna 
Circle had discussed in Germanophone publications. While Ayer’s views are largely derived 
from the Circle’s debates, they are also at the same time responding to and taking up original 
and interesting systematic positions with respect to these debates. And though Ayer’s views 
are an example of the diversity involved within what may broadly be called Logical 
Empiricism, Ayer’s book was at the time among the very few works written in English to 
discuss this movement. 
 The correct way to read Ayer’s work would be to understand it to be one among the 
diversity of views and works within Logical Empiricism. It is a systematic work that enters 
into a conversation at its very last stages (and it is perhaps due to this that it did not receive an 
answer from the members of the Vienna Circle who had earlier been involved in the 
conversation).
21
 The problems underlined above are side effects of its use as an introductory 
textbook, which gave it a privileged place in the Anglophone reception of Logical 
Empiricism. Perhaps like any other book, if read by itself (as it often has been), LTL 
generates a number of distortions of the Vienna Circle’s views, while facilitating a 
misunderstanding of their position within the history of philosophy. Read alongside other 
works, it is illuminating. 
 
5. The Radicalized ‘Elimination’ of Metaphysics? 
LTL opens with a chapter titled ‘the Elimination of Metaphysics’ (p. 33), where the central 
doctrines which are to be elaborated throughout the book are introduced, and their consequent 
reconfiguration of philosophy without metaphysics is discussed. Ayer presents the well-
known thesis that a metaphysical statement is “a sentence which purports to express a 
genuine proposition, but does, in fact, express neither a tautology nor an empirical 
hypothesis” (1946, p. 41) and is thereby nonsensical. This is the thesis that the rest of the 
book will attempt to substantiate. 
 Having presented this view, Ayer attempts to explain how metaphysicians fall into the 
error of producing such nonsense. In his attempted explanation, Ayer combines: (i) a 
particular interpretation of Russell’s theory of descriptions, (ii) a dialogue with Carnap’s 
“Overcoming Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language”, and (iii) his own 
prior involvement in Anglophone debates concerning the meaningfulness of metaphysics. 
 Ayer employs two main examples to illustrate the metaphysician’s lapse into error. 
His first example is the linguistic employment of the term ‘substance’. His second example is 
the metaphysical concept of Being, which extends to talk of fictional entities. What these two 
cases have in common is that philosophers, without having any awareness of this, are misled 
by the underlying grammatical structures of our everyday language into nonsensical 
discussions revolving around such terms. 
                                                          
20
 See the chapters of László Kocsis and Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau in this chapter. 
21
 See also Uebel (2007, p. 334). For more detail on some of the ways in which Ayer is involved in ongoing 
debates within the Vienna Circle, see e.g. Thomas Uebel’s, Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau’s and Christian 
Damböck’s chapters. 
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 In the case of the term ‘substance’, the metaphysician’s confusion is due to the fact 
that the relevant sentences include grammatical subjects. Misled by the fact that we speak in 
sentences that have a subject and a predicate, Ayer claims, metaphysicians falsely conclude 
that there exist such things as simple entities, corresponding to grammatical subjects, to 
which all the “sensible appearances of a thing” (1946, p. 42) may be predicated. Ayer argues 
that the grammar at work here implies that the sensible appearances need to be appearances 
of something. Yet, according to Ayer, “logical analysis shows that what makes these 
‘appearances’ the ‘appearances of’ the same thing is not their relationship to an entity other 
than themselves, but their relationship to one another” (1946, p. 42). In other words, the 
philosophical discussions concerning the existence of substances are misguided side-effects 
of the underlying grammar. 
 A similar analysis is applied by Ayer to the concept of ‘Being’ (which notably also 
has a central role to play in Carnap’s critique of metaphysics). The grammatical cause for 
philosophical debates concerning being is traced by Ayer to the fact that “sentences which 
express existential propositions and sentences which express attributive propositions may be 
of the same grammatical form” (1946, p. 42). The similarities in grammatical form lead, 
according to Ayer, to the false assumption that such sentences “are of the same logical type” 
(p. 42). Thus attributive propositions appear to imply existence, whereas they do not. Ayer 
appeals to the Kantian insight that existence is not an attribute, backed by John Wisdom’s 
(1931, 62-63) argument, according to which “if existence where itself an attribute, it would 
follow that all positive existential propositions were tautologies, and all negative existential 
propositions self-contradictory; and this is not the case” (1946, p. 43).  
 In other words, to use Ayer’s examples, 
 
 1) Martyrs suffer 
 
does not imply that 
 
 2) Martyrs exist. 
 
Furthermore, 2) is not a tautology, nor would 
 
 3) Martyrs do not exist 
 
be a contradiction. 
 Ayer also goes on to analyze examples of fictional entities (which Carnap does not) in 
an implicit dialogue with Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions. In the case of statements 
involving fictional entities, we have a similar effect of the grammar of everyday language 
misleading us into thinking that these are of the same type as some sentences referring to 
existing things. Ayer compares the examples of 
 




 5) Unicorns are fictitious. 
 
Here the surface grammar misleads us into thinking that these two sentences are of the same 
logical type, whereas they are not. These are, again, attributive sentences, which misleadingly 
seem to imply the existence of the thing to which properties are being attributed. Logical 
 11 
analysis has shown us that sentences about fictional entities do not imply the existence of 
such entities. In other words, 5) does not imply that unicorns exist. This is the type of error 
that led to metaphysicians (and perhaps Ayer has Russell’s portrayal of Meinong in mind 
here) towards assuming that fictional entities must “have a mode of real being which is 
different from the mode of being of existent things” (1946, p. 43). 
 There is a puzzle which Ayer’s presentation of his analysis does not resolve 
concerning the relation between his theory of meaning (i.e. the contention that only 
tautologies and empirical hypotheses are meaningful sentences) and the type of logical 
analysis he is presenting here. There seems to be a gap between the verificationism he already 
developed, and the discussion of the misleading aspects of the surface grammar of language. 
It is clear that one need not be a verificationist in order to distinguish sentences into different 
logical types. Ayer (by contrast, for example, to Carnap (1932/1959, pp. 67-73)) does not 
directly address this question. 
 Nonetheless, his discussion of fictional entities brings back the verificationist theory 
of meaning in objecting to the metaphysical discussion of different modes of being. 
According to Ayer, the metaphysical postulation of “a special non-empirical mode of real 
being” (p. 43) for fictional objects is “devoid of all literal significance” (p. 43) for two 
reasons: 
 
i) The first reason relies on the verificationist view according to which sentences are 
meaningful if they are either tautologies or empirical hypotheses. The sentence 
 
 6) Unicorns have a special non-empirical mode of real being 
 
is neither a tautology, nor an empirical hypothesis (since there is no way of empirically 
“testing whether an object is real in this sense” (1946, p. 43)). Thus it is nonsense. 
 
ii) The second reason concerns the misleading grammatical similarities between attributive 
and existential sentences, and the metaphysical postulation at work here is “a fallacy of the 
same order as the fallacy of supposing that existence is an attribute, and it can be exposed in 
the same way” (1946, p. 43). 
 
Ayer is unclear on the relation between these two reasons. On the one hand, he hints towards 
the view that the grammatical form misleads the metaphysician into the breach of the 
principle of verifiability, when he claims that the mistake “comes to be made as a result of the 
assumption that being fictitious is an attribute” (1946, p. 43). On the other hand, as we have 
seen, he points out that the mistake “can be exposed in the same way” as other mistakes due 
to surface grammar; but such an exposition is possible independently of the verificationist 
theory of meaning. 
 
6. Ayer’s Divergences from Carnap 
Though Ayer’s source for the ideas he develops here is clearly Carnap, who is both cited in 
the relevant passages (p. 44) and mentioned in the introduction (p. 32), Ayer’s account 
diverges from Carnap’s. Carnap’s (1932/1959) account involves a twofold division of the 
type of erroneous employment of language that leads to nonsensical metaphysics. On the one 
hand, there are certain metaphysical pseudo-concepts which render any sentence they are 
inserted into unverifiable (1932/1959, pp. 65-67). In the history of language, according to 
Carnap’s contentious claim, these are concepts which shifted away from their original 
empirical content, thus deceitfully seeming still meaningful (ibid.). On the other hand, there 
are metaphysical pseudo-sentences, i.e. sentences that combine words in a nonsensical 
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manner (1932/1959, pp. 67-68).
22
 Carnap here differentiates between the grammar of 
ordinary language, or what he calls “historico-grammatical syntax” (1932/1959, p. 69), from 
what he calls “logical syntax” (ibid.). The rules of the former allow for the formation of 
sentences which have no possible translation into logically syntactical sentences. In other 
words, they appear as if they are a meaningful sequence of words, given that they contain no 
breach of “historico-grammatical syntax”. Yet the development of modern logic allows us to 
show that the sequence of words does not translate into a well-formed formula. 
 Thus, according to Carnap, modern logic is the tool that allows for the fulfillment of 
the attempt to overcome metaphysics undertaken by various earlier philosophical schools. 
Ayer’s problematic encounter with Carnap’s text already appears in their different choices of 
words. Where Carnap had talked of overcoming metaphysics [“die Überwindung der 
Metaphysik”] (Carnap 1932/1959, p. 60), Ayer employed the phrase “the elimination of 
metaphysics” (1946, p. 33). The difference in wording in fact reflects a difference in either 
philosopher’s stance towards metaphysics. 
 Carnap’s use of the term “overcoming” seems to refer to Nietzsche, who also talks of 
“die Überwindung der Metaphysik” (see e.g. Sachs 2011). Carnap also explicitly claims 
Nietzsche as a predecessor to the position he is defending, citing his stance towards 
metaphysics approvingly (1932/1959, p. 80). The choice of the term “Überwindung” reflects 
the purposes Carnap seems to have had in mind as the outcome of the demonstration of the 
linguistic errors metaphysicians fall into. In Carnap’s view, the employment of meaningless 
metaphysical concepts and statements is a misguided, and thus futile, effort to debate in 
theoretical terms something which cannot be expressed in such language. In a subsequent 
addendum to his paper from 1957 (not available to Ayer in 1936, Carnap differentiates 
between cognitive meaning, and some type of emotive element of quasi-meaningfulness 
(1932/1959, pp. 80-81). Carnap clearly denies that metaphysical nonsense has any cognitive 
meaning, which is precisely what prevents such pseudo-statements from entering into a 
theoretical debate, where what is at stake is the assignment of truth-values to statements. 
Nonetheless, Carnap acknowledges that those who employ metaphysical sentences are 
attempting, and failing, to communicate something.
23
 According to Carnap (1932/1959, pp. 
78-80), metaphysicians have tended to unknowingly attempt to put into theoretical terms 
something like their overall attitude towards life. Theory is simply the wrong medium in 
which to undertake this attempt.
24
 Carnap thus likens metaphysicians to bad poets or 
“musicians without musical ability” (1932/1959, p. 80), mistakenly shifting away from the 
proper medium in which to successfully communicate such non-theoretical attitudes towards 
life. Carnap’s claiming of Nietzsche as a predecessor relies on his reading of Nietzsche as 
someone who understood this, and thus split his work between purely empirical studies on 
the one hand, and pure poetry on the other, thus avoiding the error of presenting his poetry as 
theory (ibid.). In 1929, Carnap had even presented a version of this idea to the students of the 
Bauhaus as an exhortation towards taking up the role metaphysics had played in culture, now 
that logical analysis can overcome it (Dahms 2004). 
                                                          
22
 Ayer elsewhere (“Demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysics”) addresses this distinction by 
explaining that, like Carnap, he considers that “questions about the meaning of a concept reduce themselves to 
questions about the meanings of […] the simplest proposition in which it can significantly occur” (1934a, p. 
337). The absence of such an account in LTL could simply be an omission on Ayer’s behalf, or it could signal 
Ayer’s distancing himself from Carnap’s account (though resolving this question would require going beyond 
the bounds of this inquiry). 
23
 Ayer (1934a, pp. 338, 342) also sees that there may be an attempt to convey emotion behind some nonsensical 
sequence of words. 
24
 While later in LTL Ayer resists this conclusion, Ayer (1934a, p. 342) had briefly restated Carnap’s point about 
metaphysics being the result of a “desire also to express their feelings about the world. Literature and the arts 
afford the most satisfactory medium for such expression”. 
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 LTL, though all too quickly, indirectly stands against Carnap’s position concerning 
the relation between metaphysics and poetry. Ayer does not refer directly to Carnap, but 
rather presents a version of his dialogue with C.A. Mace when he speaks of it being 
“fashionable to speak of the metaphysician as a kind of misplaced poet” (1946, p. 44).25 
Ayer’s debate with Mace, published in the pages of Analysis in 1934, had involved a 
rendition of Carnap’s critique of Heidegger.26 
 Ayer puts Carnap’s position, via Mace, in terms of different types of value: whereas 
metaphysical “statements have no literal meaning” (p. 44), they may have some value that is 
emotive, ethical, aesthetic or artistic. He proceeds to argue against this version of the view 
first of all by claiming that it misrepresents poetry, which according to Ayer usually involves 
sentences that are literally meaningful (though they might be false). Ayer (1946, pp. 44-45) 
concedes that, as Carnap also points out, there is a distinction to be made between the goals 
of the scientist and the artist. While the truth-value of the former’s statements is central to her 
goals, it does not matter if the latter’s work consists only of false statements. The 
metaphysician, Ayer points out (p. 45), unintentionally falls into the error of nonsense, while 
the poet tends to intentionally employ nonsense to some particular end. An unintentional 
lapse into nonsense does not merit, for Ayer, any attribution of aesthetic value. Ayer 
considers the possibility that, even after this, “there remain a number of metaphysical 
passages which are the work of genuine mystical feeling; and they more plausibly may be 
held to have moral or aesthetic value” (p. 45). He nonetheless goes on to clarify that there is 
no significant distinction to make between such purported insight, on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, nonsense purely due to the misuse of language. As Ayer puts it, “henceforth 
we may pursue our philosophical researches with as little regard” (p. 45) to one as to the 
other. 
 Ayer’s sentiment here does not simply reject Carnap’s view of metaphysics as a 
misplaced attempt at expression. Ayer might also seem to be going against the spirit of a 
number of Logical Empiricists who had seen the project of overcoming metaphysics as 
involving a significant component of reclaiming from “metaphysics” what may be 
reformulated in empirical terms. Overcoming, rather than eliminating, metaphysics also 
meant extruding metaphysical elements from scientific enquiry, including the historical and 
social sciences. Whereas Ayer instructs us to go on with our philosophical researches, paying 
no heed to what we take to be metaphysical, figures like Carnap thought carefully about how 
to salvage the parts of our culture which have been led to metaphysical impasses. 
 To be fair to Ayer, he did in fact share this spirit when, in earlier work, he had 
clarified that “in many cases, once the work has been made to shed its metaphysical coating, 
pieces of genuine philosophising remain” (1934a, p. 343). He even goes against this spirit in 
the opposite direction when he notes that “the discovery that all metaphysical assertions are 
nonsensical is consistent with piety towards the great philosophers of the past” (1934a, p. 
343). It may be important, however, to note that such views are offered in earlier publications 
by Ayer, and are omitted from LTL. It could thus be argued that LTL not only functioned as a 
distortion of the Vienna Circle’s views, but also offers a radicalized rendition of Ayer’s 





7. The Aftermath 
                                                          
25
 The dialogue begins as a response to Richards (1924) in Mace (1934a). Ayer replied in Ayer, A. J. (1934b), to 
which Mace responded in C. A. Mace (1934b). 
26
 As noted above, Ayer’s “Demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysics”, published a month later in July 
1934, also cites Carnap’s article, as well as Schlick, as the sources of its arguments. 
27
 Furthermore, Ayer had different targets and motivations than the Vienna Circle; see Vrahimis (2013a). 
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As we have already seen, Ayer’s book focused on discussions of particular problems, and 
only very briefly touched upon the context in which they had initially been addressed by the 
Vienna Circle and its predecessors. The reception of his work also followed course, and the 
bold claims made by LTL resulted in bringing a critical debate over the viability of 
verificationism to the center of Anglophone philosophy during the 30s and 40s. Within this 
debate, there had been little concern about the acceptability of Ayer’s brief history of Logical 
Empiricism. The differences between Ayer’s and the Vienna Circle’s views were overlooked, 
with some exceptions concerning the core doctrines of verificationism at stake during the 
subsequent debate. The context of the Vienna Circle’s work was often deemed irrelevant to 
the debate, and thus its examination would be postponed until quite recently. The 
philosophical debate ignored the fact that the Vienna Circle was critically engaged in larger 
Germanophone debates. Ayer’s rendition of the Vienna Circle’s arguments would give 
Anglophone philosophy further reason why it should “pursue our philosophical researches 
with […] little regard” (1946, p. 45) to the other sides involved in Germanophone debates. 
We can see this through the example of the difference between Carnap’s engagement with 
Heidegger, which though vehemently polemical is still keenly aware of the opposition’s 
standpoint (Vrahimis 2013a). It would subsequently invoke further responses within 
Germanophone philosophy, such as that by Horkheimer (see Horkheimer (1982); Dahms 
(1994, pp. 97-154); O’Neil and Uebel (2004)). By contrast, Ayer’s use of Carnap’s 
arguments, at first in a brief mention against Heidegger and later also applied against Sartre, 
would function as justification for Anglophone analytic philosophers not to engage with such 
thinkers (see Vrahimis 2013a, 2013b). Interestingly, they did not function as such for Ayer 
himself, who would produce a number of critical commentaries on various so-called 
‘continental’ philosophers throughout his life.28 
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